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Abstract   
 
This paper investigates the importance of factor endowment vis-à-vis institutions in 
explaining the locational choice of foreign investors during the 1990s. Using dynamic 
panel estimation on data for transition economies, we find that low labour costs, 
bureaucratic efficiency (“institutions”), agglomeration economies and natural resource 
abundance are key factors explaining foreign investors’ decisions. However, sampling 
proves fundamental as these overall determinants mask deep and, so far empirically 
unexplored, differences between groups of recipient countries. For example, for the former 
Soviet Union economies we estimate that labour costs are no longer crucial, but abundance 
of natural resources and (interestingly) lower levels of human capital are. For Eastern 
Europe, we find that external liberalisation (one aspect of economic reform) is crucial in 
foreign investor’s decisions. The main message is that minimising sampling biases and 
accounting for previously omitted variables yields a different, much richer picture than 
previously available. 
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Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan tuotannontekijöiden varantojen ja instituutioiden 
suhteellista merkitystä 1990-luvun suorien ulkomaisten sijoitusten kohdentumisen 
kannalta. Siirtymätalousmaiden paneelidataa käyttäen tutkimuksessa osoitetaan, että 
hallinnon tehokkuus (instituutiot), keskittymisedut ja luonnonvarojen saatavuus ovat 
keskeisiä selittäjiä ulkomaisten investoijien päätöksissä. Nämä keskimääräiset selittäjät 
jättävät kuitenkin varjoonsa perusluonteisia, aikaisemmin tutkimattomia eroja investointeja 
vastaanottavien maiden välillä. Esimerkiksi entisen Neuvostoliiton maiden tapauksessa 
työvoimakustannukset eivät enää ole merkittäviä, kun taas luonnonvarojen saatavuus ja 
inhimillisen pääoman alhaisempi taso ovat. Itä-Euroopan maihin investoiville ulkomaisille 
taas talouden ulkoinen vapauttaminen (yksi talousreformin puoli) on tärkeää. Tutkimuksen 
pääviesti on, että otannan virheiden minimointi ja aiemmin tutkimattomien selittävien 
muuttujien mukaanotto antavat aiempaa rikkaamman kuvan tutkimusongelmasta. 
 
Asiasanat: suorat ulkomaiset sijoitukset, dynaaminen paneeliestimointi, siirtymätaloudet 
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1  Introduction   
 
This paper investigates the importance of institutions vis-à-vis factor endowments as 
determinants of FDI inflows to the transition economies in Central Europe and in the 
former Soviet Union. The transition from centrally planned to market economy started 
more-or-less simultaneously in nearly thirty countries that differ substantially in terms of 
inherited institutions, initial conditions, income levels, and reform paths.
 This richness of 
variation allows comparative analysis in a unique situation akin to a natural experiment: a 
number of centrally planned economies set out to implement economic and political 
reforms, applying different strategies and experiencing dramatically different outcomes in 
many dimensions, including FDI. The collapse of the socialist system in the late 1980s 
created myriad investment opportunities in the Central and Eastern European and former 
Soviet Union countries. These economies were industrialized and could count on a 
relatively cheap yet highly educated workforce. FDI was also perceived as a catalyst as it 
could bring not only less volatile capital flows but also the technology and managerial 
know-how necessary for restructuring firms.
1  
Despite early hope for large FDI inflows into the region, these high expectations 
have not thus far materialized. The share of FDI inflows into transition economies has been 
consistently less than for other developing regions such as Asia and Latin America. 
Between 1990 and 1994, transition economies received 2.1 percent of global FDI inflows, 
while Latin America received about 10 percent, and Asia received about 20  percent 
(UNCTAD, 2002). Between 1995 and 1999, transition economies received 3.2 percent of 
global FDI inflows, while Latin America received about 12 percent and Asia received 
about 16 percent (UNCTAD, 2002). Although FDI flows to transition countries increased 
in the second half of the 1990s, they were still disproportionately concentrated in a handful 
of Central and Eastern European and Baltic (CEEB) countries.
2 For instance, between 1990 
and 1994, the CEEB received 95 percent of the total per capita FDI to transition countries. 
Between 1995 and 1998 the CEEB share declined, but was still 84 percent. 
                                                 
1 See Estrin, Hughes, and Todd (1997), Lankes and Venables (1996), and Prasad et al (2003).  
2 In per capita terms, the larger recipients were Hungary, Estonia, Czech Republic and Poland. Russia, 
Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan also received a large share of total inflows. See EBRD (2000), p.74. Yuko Kinoshita and Nauro F. Campos  Estimating the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows:  





This paper addresses two branches of the literature on FDI. The first involves 
locational determinants of FDI. One of the recent developments is the incorporation of 
institutional quality in modeling the location decision of foreign firms.
3  Institutions 
underpin local business operating conditions, but they differ from “physical” supporting 
factors such as transport and communication infrastructures. The basic notion is that less 
corruption, a fair, predictable, and expedient judiciary, and an efficient bureaucracy help 
attract FDI. Data limitations have impeded extensive testing of these ideas, constraining 
existing studies to focus on just one aspect of the issue, normally corruption. In this paper, 
we examine an array of institutional features and try to assess their relative importance.  
This paper also tries to contribute to a second strand of literature, that on FDI in 
transition economies. Most past studies have focused on the more advanced countries in 
transition, the CEEB countries, to the detriment of the CIS countries. For instance, Bevan 
and Estrin (2000) study the determinants of FDI inflows into 11 transition economies,
4 
while Resmini (2000) uses a similar set of 10 countries. In this study, we use a set of 
25 countries covering both the more and less advanced countries in transition. Hence, our 
objective is to provide a fuller and more complete identification of the factors that affect 
the success and failure of transition countries in attracting FDI.
 One exception is the study 
by Garibaldi at al (2001) that covers a large number of transition countries. Yet using 
different variables and different estimation methods they conclude that FDI can be well 
explained by macroeconomic fundamentals.
5 
We use a unique panel data set covering 25 transition economies between 1990 and 
1998.
6 The results show that the main determinants of FDI inflows to these countries are 
institutions, natural resources, labor costs, and persistence. We also investigate whether the 
set of determinants varies across the region. We find that for the Eastern European and 
Baltic countries, institutions, persistence, and the extent of economic reforms are the main 
                                                 
3 Two important theories throw light on the locational determinants of FDI. Factor endowments-based trade 
theory argues that FDI is drawn to countries with lower wages and more abundant natural resources. The new 
trade theory suggests that economies of scale are a driving force of FDI, and agglomeration effects often play 
a crucial role. See Wheeler and Mody (1992), Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995), and Kinoshita and Mody 
(2001).
  
4 The 11 transition countries analyzed in Bevan and Estrin (2000) are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine. 
5 Two issues that distinguish our work from Garibaldi et al (2001) are the addition of institutional variables 
and the use of a generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) estimator.  
6 The economies covered in the data are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.  BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 





determinants, while for the CIS countries,
7 abundant natural resources and economic 
reforms are the main drivers of FDI inflows.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the theoretical 
framework on the location determinants of FDI. In Section III, we discuss the estimation 
method and the variables used to examine the determinants of FDI. Section IV reports the 




2  Literature Review   
 
What are the characteristics of the host country that attract FDI? The emerging consensus 
is that it depends on the motives of foreign investors and, thus, which of three types of FDI 
they are undertaking.
8 One type of FDI is called market-seeking FDI, whose purpose is to 
serve local and regional markets. It is also called horizontal FDI, as it involves replication 
of production facilities in the host country.
9 Tariff-jumping or export-substituting FDI is a 
variant of this type of FDI. Because the reason for horizontal FDI is to better serve a local 
market by local production, market size and market growth of the host economy play 
important roles. Impediments to accessing local markets, such as tariffs and transport costs, 
also encourage this type of FDI. 
A second type of FDI is called resource-seeking: when firms invest abroad to 
acquire resources not available in the home country, such as natural resources, raw 
materials, or low-cost labor. Especially in the manufacturing sector, when multinationals 
directly invest in order to export, factor-cost considerations become important. In contrast 
to horizontal FDI, vertical or export-oriented FDI involves relocating parts of the 
production chain to the host country. Availability of low-cost labor is a prime driver for 
                                                 
7 The CIS stands for the Commonwealth of Independent States, which consists of all former Soviet Union 
countries (excluding the Baltic States): Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.  
8 See Dunning (1993).  
9 The mode of horizontal FDI is typically “greenfield investment.”  Yuko Kinoshita and Nauro F. Campos  Estimating the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows:  





export-oriented FDI. Naturally, FDI in the resource sector, such as oil and natural gas, is 
attracted to countries with abundant natural endowments.
10  
The third type of FDI, called efficiency-seeking, occurs when the firm can gain 
from the common governance of geographically dispersed activities in the presence of 
economies of scale and scope. Bevan and Estrin (2000) found that prospective membership 
in the EU, because it is conductive to the establishment of regional corporate networks, 
seems to have attracted more efficiency-seeking FDI to those countries after the initial 
announcement of the progress of EU accession.
11 
Together, the factors attracting each type of FDI suggest that the countries with a 
large market, low-cost labor, abundant natural resources, and close proximity to the major 
Western markets would attract larger amounts of FDI inflows. FDI would thus go to 
countries with favorable initial conditions. However, research suggests that other factors 
also matter.  
Based on a survey of Western manufacturing companies, Lankes and Venables 
(1996) find that the main purpose of FDI in transition economies before 1995 varied 
substantially across countries. They observed a noticeable shift from projects to serve local 
markets to those serving export markets. Export-oriented FDI was then expected to 
increase as the market integration with the EU progresses.   
Another important variable for explaining the geographical distribution of FDI is a 
pattern of persistence over time. Compared to other forms of capital flows such as portfolio 
investment, the time series of FDI are generally more stable due to the high sunk cost 
nature of FDI. FDI is often accompanied by physical investment that is irreversible in the 
short run. Thus, a large amount of  FDI in the country today implies a large amount of FDI 
tomorrow. Also, FDI is persistent over time due to presence of agglomeration economies.  
If agglomeration economies are present, new investors mimic past investment decisions by 
other investors in choosing where to invest. By locating next to other firms, they benefit 
from positive spillovers from investors already producing in the host country. The common 
sources for these positive externalities are knowledge spillovers, specialized labor, and 
intermediate inputs.
12 
                                                 
10 As reported in Esanov et al (2001), most FDI in resource-rich countries of the CIS is of this type.  
11 World Investment Report  (UNCTAD, 2002) suggests that, with the EU accession of various CEEB 
countries, the integration of operations by EU transnational corporations will be accelerated and that more 
efficiency-seeking FDI will be directed to the accession countries.  
12 Marshall (1920) argues that industrial districts arise because of technology spillovers, the advantages of BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 





There is much evidence on the value of agglomeration economies, although the 
existing studies focus on FDI in the United States or U.S. FDI abroad. A seminal work by 
Wheeler and Mody (1992) makes a strong case for agglomeration (and market size) in U.S. 
investors’ location decisions. Barrell and Pain (1999) find similar results on U.S. 
investment in Europe. Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995) find industry-level agglomeration 
economies play an important role in the location choice of Japanese manufacturing FDI in 
the United States. A recent work by Cheng and Kwang (2000) reports a similar effect of 
agglomeration in China.  
Factor-endowment theory suggests that differences in endowments and initial 
conditions among countries explain the geographical pattern of inward FDI. The only way 
the host country can affect this pattern is to change economic fundamentals. On the other 
hand, the theory of agglomeration economies  suggest that once countries attract the first 
mass of investors, the process will be self-reinforcing, without needing a change in 
policies. From this perspective, if there is any agglomeration effect, it is important to take 
it fully into account in the econometric analysis   
A growing body of literature relating institutions to economic outcomes argues that 
good economic institutions raise economic growth by promoting higher investment, higher 
educational attainment, and lower mortality (Rodrik at al, 2002; Mauro, 1995; and La Porta 
at al, 1998, 1999).
13 We believe that good institutions can also play a crucial mediating role 
in attracting FDI. 
The aspects of institutions we discuss here are the rule of law and quality of 
bureaucracy which are particularly relevant to investment climate of the host country. 
14 
For instance, foreign investors will be reluctant to commit resources to a country if they 
perceive poor enforcement of contract and law. The risk of expropriation is an extreme 
example. Another aspect of institutions that matters to FDI is the efficiency and 
transparency of bureaucratic procedures. If foreign investors anticipate that regulations are 
                                                                                                                                                    
thick markets for specialized skills, and the backward and forward linkages. The new economic geography 
emphasizes the linkages effect: users and suppliers of intermediate inputs cluster near each other because the 
large market provides greater demand for goods and supply of inputs. See Krugman (1991), for example.  
13 More recently, Johnson et al (2000) show that differences in institutional quality of law and corporate 
governance can also explain the depth and severity of the Asian financial crisis. 
14Acemoglu et al (2003) define institutions more broadly as “a cluster of social arrangements” that include 
constitutional and social limits on politicians’ and elites’ power, the rule of law, provisions for mediating 
social cleavages, strong property rights enforcement, a minimum amount of equal opportunity and relatively 
broad-based access to education..  Yuko Kinoshita and Nauro F. Campos  Estimating the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows:  





enforced inconsistently hampering their business operation, they are less likely to invest in 
those countries. Thus, the key question we ask in this paper is how important are 
institutions and the agglomeration effect relative to other factors in the host countries.
15   
In transition economies, it is well known that the recovery after the initial drop in 
output level of these countries varied greatly across countries (Campos and Coricelli, 
2002). Yet the CEEB countries tended to recover fastest despite different inflation rates, 
fiscal deficits, external debts, and privatization strategies. Moreover, these countries had 
been relatively more open to trade even before the process of transition began. Favorable 
initial conditions caused these countries to receive most of the FDI to the region at the time 
of disintegration of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1991.   
In summary, in order to understand the determinants of FDI in transition 
economies, it is crucial to specify an empirical model that allows for a combination of 
traditional (e.g., market size and labor costs), newer (e.g., institutions), and transition-
specific determining factors (e.g., initial conditions).  
 
 
3  Data and Econometric Model   
 
The data used in this study comprise a panel of 25 transition countries (the CEEB and the 
CIS) between 1990 and 1998. The number of observations in the complete panel is 225 (= 
25x9).
16 The definitions of the variables are found in Table 1. Our dependent variable is 
per capita FDI stock in real millions of U.S. dollars (deflated by the GDP deflator) and is 
constructed from a series of FDI inflows reported in the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI ). Independent variables are drawn from various sources (see Table 1). 
The cross-sectional aspect of our study is very important. Transition from planned 
to market economy started in the early 1990s in these countries, but foreign investors were 
cautious in the beginning. Due to the difficulty of obtaining sufficiently long series of FDI 
data, the past studies on FDI in transition were often limited to the more advanced 
countries in transition (e.g., the CEEB countries), which are also the major recipients of 
                                                 
15 For instance, Wei (2000a, 2000b) finds that corruption in a host country substantially deters inward FDI. 
16 The data used for estimation are unbalanced, because certain observations for the key variables are 
missing. BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 





FDI in the region. In this study, we use the full set of 25 transition economies. Including 
CIS countries in the data, we are hoping to introduce more heterogeneity and incorporate 
different motives of investment, which may vary across sectors.
17  The time series aspect is 
also important because during the time period covered in our data, transition economies 
implemented comprehensive reforms. Cross-sectional data would not allow us to take into 
account changes of the reform variables.  
 
 
3.1  Regression Variables   
 
3.1.1  Classical Sources of Comparative Advantage   
 
Investors choose a location of investment according to the expected profitability associated 
with each location. Profitability of investment is in turn affected by various country-
specific factors and by the type of investment motives. For example, market-seeking 
investors will be attracted to a country with a large and fast-growing local market. 
Resource-seeking investors will look for a country with abundant natural resources. 
Efficiency-seeking investors will weigh more heavily geographical proximity to the home 
country, to minimize transportation costs. Thus, the location of FDI is closely related to a 
country’s comparative advantage, which in turn affects the expected profitability of 
investment. The classical sources of comparative advantage are input prices, market size, 
growth of the market, and the abundance of natural resources.  
As noted earlier, market-seeking FDI is to serve the host country market. Market 
size is a measure of market demand in the country. We expect the cumulative stocks of per 
capita FDI to be greater in countries with a larger domestic market. To proxy for market 
size, we follow the literature and use real GDP per capita using the chain method 
(RGDPCH).
18 The figures are drawn from Penn World Table 6.  
If foreign investors are seeking low labor costs, the availability of cheap labor will 
be an important factor affecting FDI. We use the nominal wage rate (WAGEN) as a proxy 
                                                 
17 The main sector for inward FDI in the CEEB countries is manufacturing, while it is the resource sector in 
the CIS countries (UNCTAD, 2002).  
18 The base year is 1996.  Yuko Kinoshita and Nauro F. Campos  Estimating the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows:  






19 We drew unpublished data from UNECE’s Economic Survey of Europe. 
We would expect a negative sign on the coefficient (e.g., countries with lower labor costs 
would attract more FDI), particularly if vertical FDI predominates. Potential foreign 
investors should be concerned not only with the cost of labor, but also with its quality. A 
more educated labor force can learn and adopt new technology faster, and the cost of 
training local workers would be less for investing firms. Thus, we also test for the impact 
of labor quality, using the general secondary education enrollment rate (EDU), collected by 
UNICEF. 
The CIS countries (e.g., Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia) receive much FDI in 
resource-based industries, as they are rich in oil and natural gas. Countries rich in natural 
resources may attract foreign investment in those industries, possibly diverting investment 
from the manufacturing sector.
20 To test the effect of natural resources we use a dummy 
variable called NATRES, which indicates that the host country is poor(=0), moderate(=1), 
or rich(= 2) in natural resources.
21   
Proximity is an important factor in explaining the volume of trade flows between 
countries in a gravity model.
22 It is a stylized fact in the empirical literature that trade 
volumes between two countries are a function of both income levels of the two countries 
(GDP) and the distance between them. In a gravity model, the smaller the distance between 
two countries, the more they are expected to trade. Distance is a proxy for transportation 
costs, or (economic) barriers to trade. On the other hand, in horizontal FDI, transportation 
costs are treated as a fixed cost by investors.
23 The greater is the distance, the more likely 
for firms to relocate production facilities to the host country.  However, proximity in a 
gravity equation is generally measured as the distance between source and host countries 
(i.e., distance between the headquarters and foreign production sites). We cannot identify 
in what country FDI flows originate in the data. As an alternative, we measure the physical 
distance in kilometers from Brussels (the headquarters of the EU) to the capital city of the 
                                                 
19 Unit labor cost is an alternative measure for wage cost. However, due to the paucity of the data on unit 
labor cost, we only report the results from nominal wage rate.   
20 Gyfason and Zoega (2001) find that abundant natural resources may crowd out physical capital and inhibit 
economic growth. See also Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2002).  
21 This variable is constructed by De Melo et al (1997). We also used more direct measures (e.g., proven oil 
and gas reserves), but the results were not significantly different.  
22 Mody, Razin, and Sadka (2002) and Portes, Rey, and Oh (2001) interpret the distance as a proxy for 
informational frictions.   
23 See Krugman (1991). BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 





host country (DISB). This variable is a proxy for the ease of access to the major Western 
markets.   
Good infrastructure is a necessary condition for foreign investors to operate 
successfully, regardless of the type of FDI. We use the number of main telephone lines 
(TELEPHON) from WDI  as our infrastructure variable. Availability of main telephone 
lines is necessary to facilitate communication between the home and host countries.
24   
 
 
3.1.2  Macroeconomic Policy and Reform Variables   
 
Investment decisions in emerging markets are also influenced by economic and political 
risks. Successful implementation of economic reform by the host government is a good 
signal to investors, as a stable macroeconomic environment implies less investment risk.   
One indicator of a stable macroeconomic environment is a record of price stability. 
A history of low inflation and prudent fiscal activity signals to investors how committed 
and credible the government is. To measure stability, we use the annual average inflation 
rate (INFAV). Most transition countries experienced high inflation after liberalizing prices 
at the onset of transition. Those countries that embarked on stabilization programs early 
succeeded in bringing inflation under control rapidly. On average, the lower the average 
inflation rate is in the host country, the more successful was the stabilization program and 
the faster GDP growth returned to positive levels. Thus, we expect that the more foreign 
investment, ceteris paribus, will be attracted to countries with lower inflation rates.
25  
Another indicator of economic reform is the extent of external sector liberalization. 
To measure this we use the variable CLIE, which reflects a removal of trade controls and 
quotas, moderation of tariff rates, and foreign exchange rate restrictions.
26 Since trade 
                                                 
24 One alternative for the infrastructure variable is the percentage of paved roads in the country. But this 
variable can be misleading in transition countries: if there is one main road in the country and it is paved, 
then the value for this will be 100. Thus, only large values may not necessarily indicate better infrastructure.      
25 In developed countries, tax rates are usually thought of as an important factor in the locational decision of 
foreign investors (see, e.g., Devereux and Hubbard, 2003). In the transition economies, we expect this factor 
in the future to start playing a role. 
26 The index is constructed by De Melo et al (1997). The cumulative internal liberalization index (CLII) and 
cumulative private sector condition index (CLIP) were also tested. Due to high multicollinearity, CLII and 
CLIP were dropped. Yuko Kinoshita and Nauro F. Campos  Estimating the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows:  





flows are often a complement to FDI flows,
27 more FDI should be attracted to the countries 
with more liberalized trade regimes. On the other hand, if FDI is basically intended for 
tariff-jumping purposes, more restrictive trade regimes may attract more FDI.  
Another important policy variable we use is the index of FDI restrictions (RES). 
Larger values indicate greater restrictions on FDI flows, which would imply lower FDI 
inflows. The index is constructed by Garibaldi at al (2001), based on the IMF Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions.
28   
 
 
3.1.3  Initial Conditions   
 
Before the start of transition, the countries in our sample varied greatly in their initial level 
of development, macroeconomic distortions, and integration into the trading system of the 
socialist countries. De Melo at al (1997) argue that such initial conditions play an 
important role in determining economic performance among transition economies.
29  
Initial conditions reflect determinants that are unrelated to policies and invariant 
during the sample period. For example, these include the initial income level, the degree of 
industrial distortions, urbanization, natural resource endowment, and trade dependence 
(trade dependence is trade shares in GDP measured in 1989). Among these variables, we 
report results for natural resource endowment (NATRES) and trade dependence 
(TRADDEP) in our regressions.
30   
 
 
3.1.4  Institutions   
 
Host country institutions also influence investment decisions, because they directly affect 
business operating conditions. The cost of investment consists of not only the economic 
                                                 
27 Empirical studies find that manufacturing FDI flows complement trade flows. See Caves (1996) and Singh 
and Jun (1996).  
28 The index covers the categories on approval requirements, the extent to which profits can be remitted 
abroad, ease in liquidating assets, and preferential treatment of direct investment. See Appendix in Garibaldi 
et al (2001). 
29 Campos and Kinoshita (2002) find that both initial income level and FDI are important determinants of 
growth for 25 transition economies.  
30 Other initial conditions were tested but none of them were statistically significant.  BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
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costs of investment, but also the noneconomic costs, such as bribery and time lost in 
dealing with local authorities. To assess business operation conditions of the host country 
for investors, we use two institutional variables, ‘rule of law’ (RULELAW) and ‘quality of 
bureaucracy’ (BUROQUAL).
 The rule of law variable reflects the strength and impartiality 
of the legal system and popular observance of the law.
31 A higher score in the rule of law 
implies better legal institutions. We expect that countries with better legal infrastructure 
will be able to attract more FDI.  
The variable for the quality of the bureaucracy
32 is constructed from two indicators: 
(i) the extent to which the national bureaucracy enjoys autonomy from political pressure in 
a stable manner, and whether or not it has an effective mechanism for recruiting and 
training; and (ii) the ease of regulations concerning licensing requirements and labor, 
environmental, consumer safety, and worker health. High values for this variable implies 
lower cost for foreign investors, because an honest government with modest regulations is 
less likely to ask for bribery and side payments.  
 
 
3.1.5  Persistence   
 
FDI is considered to be one of the least volatile forms of foreign capital flows.
33 Due to 
relatively higher sunk cost of physical investment, FDI is more irreversible once it is 
undertaken and thus it is likely to be persistent over time.  At the aggregate level, this can 
be captured by a positive feedback effect of past FDI onto current FDI.  
To separate agglomeration economies from other sources of persistence, we need 
more disaggregated data (for example at the industry level) and more information on 
investors. With the aggregate data available to us, we examine persistence of FDI that is 
inclusive of agglomeration effects. The variable we use for persistence is the one-year 
lagged FDI stock, which is the approach used in most of the literature (Cheng and Kwan, 
2000). Note that the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side 
makes the OLS estimates inconsistent (we address this issue below). 
                                                 
31 It reflects the degree to which citizens are willing to accept the established institutions for making and 
implementing laws and adjudicating disputes. 
32 BUROQUAL is close to one of the three corruption measures used by Wei (2000a, 2000b).  
33 For instance, Sarno and Taylor(1999) find that FDI is less volatile than portfolio investment flows.  Yuko Kinoshita and Nauro F. Campos  Estimating the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows:  





3.2  Econometric Model   
 
We follow the model proposed by Cheng and Kwan (2000), in which they formulate the 
role of past FDI values as a process of partial stock adjustment. We assume that it takes 
time for FDI to adjust to equilibrium or desired level. The adjustment process is postulated 




− − = ∆ it it it Y Y Y α                   (1) 
 
where  1 − − = ∆ it it it Y Y Y  and 
*
it Y is an equilibrium level or a steady-state level of the FDI 
stock. By rearranging the above, we get:  
 
*
1 ) 1 ( it it it Y Y Y α α + − = −                  (2) 
 
where  α  must be less than 1 for stability. The steady-state level of the FDI stock is 
determined by  it X , a vector of economic, policy, and institutional variables discussed in 
the previous subsections. Thus:  
 
it it it v X Y + = β
*                    (3)   
 
where  it v  is an error term that includes the country-specific as well as time-specific effects. 
The regression model we will estimate is thus:   
 
it t i it




+ + = −
γ η ε
ε λ δ 1                     (4) 
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where  , 1 α δ − = , αβ λ = and  it it v α ε = . In addition,  i η contains the country-specific 
attributes and  t γ  is a vector of time-specific attribute (e.g., time dummies). If there is a 
positive feedback effect of past FDI to current FDI, then δ  should be positive.  
Because the lagged  1 − it Y  and the time-invariant country-specific attribute  i η  are 
correlated, the OLS estimate is inconsistent. To correct for this problem, we take a first 
difference:  
 
it it it it X Y Y ε λ δ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ −1                  (5) 
 
However,  1 − ∆ it Y  and  it ε ∆  are still correlated. To get consistent estimates, we employ the 
instrumental variables (IV) estimates, or the generalized method of moments (GMM) 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). GMM has advantages over the standard IV 
estimates because as the length of the panel increases, so does the number of valid 
instruments. For equation (5), valid instruments are lagged levels of dependent variables, 
s it Y −  where  2 ≥ s and  . ,..., 4 , 3 T t =    If  it X  is strictly exogenous, then  s it X − ∆  (for all s) can 
be used as an additional instrument to increase the efficiency of the estimates. The validity 
of instruments is checked by the Sargan test. The second-order correlation of the error term 
in the first-differenced equation is assessed using Arellano-Bond statistics for 
autocorrelation, which is asymptotically distributed as N(0,1).  
When the number of observations is small relative to that of parameter estimates, 
however, we should be concerned with small sample bias being introduced in the GMM 
estimation. Because the data set we employ may suffer from such a bias, we report a fixed-
effects model and compare it with those obtained from GMM where appropriate. 
 
 
4  Estimation Results   
 
In this section we discuss our econometric results. As mentioned, our objective is to 
provide a more comprehensive description of the rationale of foreign firms to invest in 
transition economies. To do so, we try to go beyond the traditional factors identified in the Yuko Kinoshita and Nauro F. Campos  Estimating the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows:  





literature (e.g., labor and transportation costs) and incorporate in the analysis the role of 
institutions. We argue that the omission of such factors can bias existing results.  
 
 
4.1  Host Country Characteristics as FDI Determinants   
 
Table 2 reports the regression results for all countries in our sample. The first column 
presents the fixed effects model and the second and third columns show the GMM 
estimations.
34 Our dependent variable  it Y  is per capita FDI stock
35 in year t, measured in 
constant millions of U.S. dollars. All regressions include year dummies to control for time 
variation from changes in external economic environment common across countries.  
In the past, models often exclude agglomeration effects as a determinant. In reality, 
it takes time for the stock of FDI to reach the optimal level. The introduction of the partial 
adjustment mechanism is easily handled by including a lagged dependent variable (Cheng 
and Kwan, 2000). As noted , including a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side 
of the equation causes OLS to yield inconsistent estimates, as the lagged dependent 
variable is endogenous. To address this problem, we report the GMM results in Table 2.
36 
In small samples such as ours, the GMM estimators may not be efficient. Thus, alongside 
the results from GMM, we report the fixed-effects model for comparison.  
Table 2 reports the results for the pooled sample. Column I shows the fixed effects 
model. The coefficient of the lagged FDI δ  is 0.81, implying a coefficient of partial 
adjustment  α of 0.19. This means that net investment in one year is 19 percent of the 
difference between Y* and Y. If the steady-state level of the FDI stock does not change, it 
will take about five years for the gap between the equilibrium and the current FDI stock to 
close. The partial adjustment coefficient is somewhat reduced in size in columns II and III, 
which report the GMM model, and ranges from 0.21 to 0.25. Since the lower α  implies 
the slower speed of adjustment, this implies a larger role for persistence in the pattern of 
FDI in these transition economies.  
                                                 
34 The Hausman test rejects the random effects model.  
35 One alternative is to use the ratio of FDI to GDP. In transition economies, GDP is quite volatile during the 
initial years of transition. Thus, we prefer per capita FDI to FDI/GDP.    
36 On GMM estimation, see Arellano and Bond (1991). BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
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The specification tests in the GMM show a mixed result in column II. The p-value 
of the Sargan test is 0.001, so we can reject the null hypothesis that the over-identifying 
restrictions are valid. Yet, the SOC test does not show second-order serial correlation. This 
would imply that the model is correctly specified, from this perspective. The above results 
suggest that some of our independent variables may not be strictly exogenous. For 
example, the error term in the current period might affect future changes in real GDP and 
wages.
37 We experimented with different sets of the variables and could not reject that 
market size and labor cost are predetermined. Column III reports the results for the GMM 
estimates when market size and labor cost are treated as weakly exogenous. The Sargan 
test shows that we can no longer reject the possibility that the instruments are valid in 
column III.  
If we compare columns II and III, most coefficients are reasonably similar. One 
should note that, by using appropriate instruments, we reinforce what we initially found in 
the fixed-effects model in column III, particularly the significance of external liberalization 
and rule of law.  
The results also indicate that FDI into the region is an intricate mixture of all the 
various types of FDI discussed earlier. For example, the coefficient of market size is 0.01 
throughout different specifications: an increase in real GDP by 1 percent leads to 0.1 
percent increase in per capita FDI. This implies that foreign investors are indeed attracted 
to a large domestic market (market-seeking FDI). Market size becomes insignificant, 
however, in the GMM, which implies that market-seeking motives may not be a robust 
finding in these countries. 
Lower cost sites also attract FDI, as seen from the negative sign on labor cost. 
Lankes and Venables (1996) find for the first half of the 1990s that FDI in the region was 
mostly market-seeking. They argue that, as the region integrates into European production 
networks, we would observe more export-oriented FDI. Our finding is consistent with their 
prediction for the second half of the 1990s.  
Another important explanatory variable is the abundance of natural resources. Since 
it is a qualitative variable, we cannot interpret its elasticity with respect to FDI. But the 
finding for natural resources, or resource-seeking FDI, is robust. Most resource rich 
                                                 
37 Cheng and Kwan (2000) test for strict exogeneity of the following four variables: income, wage, education, 
and infrastructure. They find that the first two are endogenous, or weakly exogenous, in explaining FDI in Yuko Kinoshita and Nauro F. Campos  Estimating the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows:  





countries are in the CIS, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Russia. For these countries, the abundance of natural resources may be one of the most 
important drivers of FDI.
38 We will discuss this point further in the next subsection. 
The results on reform, policy, and institutional variables are striking. Most of these 
variables turn out to be positive and significant. There are two trade related variables used 
in our regressions. One is the reform variable, the cumulative external liberalization index. 
The other is trade dependence, which measures trade openness in 1989. Not surprisingly, 
external liberalization contributes not only to an increase in trade volume, but also to 
greater inflows of FDI. Greater initial trade openness also contributes to more FDI inflows. 
In newly opening emerging market economies, insufficient information on local conditions 
increases uncertainty and risks of the investment. Potential foreign investors may become 
better informed of local conditions from trade in goods and more encouraged to invest in 
the country they know better. Our results show that FDI flows complement trade flows. As 
for institutional variables, there is a strong indication that the countries with good 
institutions managed to attract more inflows of FDI. A good system of law and law 
enforcement is reflected in high scores of rule of law, signals that investors’ rights will be 
more likely to be protected. Thus they are more likely to collect profits from their 
investment projects. The other institutional variable, the quality of bureaucracy, reflects the 
level of corruption and the burden of regulation. The positive and significant coefficient 
presents further evidence that poor public sector institutions or poor quality of bureaucracy 
deter to economic growth, as they reduce FDI. 
We also find that restrictions on FDI are negative and significant. This implies that 
capital controls for direct foreign investment, such as approval requirements and 
restrictions on profit remittance abroad, deter inward FDI. In this sense, policies limiting 
foreign capital inflows are quite effective at inhibiting FDI.   
On the other hand, variables such as the level of education and infrastructure are 
found to be insignificant, though they have the expected sign. An insignificant coefficient 
on education is different from the finding by Noorbakhsh at al (2001) that high labor 
quality is an important determinant of FDI. Their argument reflects the observation that an 
                                                                                                                                                    
Chinese regions.    
38 All time-invariant variables (natural resources, distance from Brussels, trade dependence and restrictions 
on FDI) drop out after first-differencing, so we first transform them by multiplying by a time trend. Similar 
coefficients are obtained when we re-estimate the models using the individual means of Y and X over time. 
See Hsiao (1986) for further discussion.  BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
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increasing number of FDI projects in developing countries are undertaken in more 
technologically sophisticated industries, which require higher levels of human capital. This 
might be true for a broader set of developing countries such as Asia, in which FDI occurs 
mainly in the manufacturing sector. This tendency is not observed in the CEEB and CIS 
countries. Another possibility is the lack of cross-country variance, as most of these 
economies show rather high levels of human capital.  
Finally, a positive sign of the inflation rate is obviously surprising. It is widely 
accepted that disinflation in the initial stage is key factor to rapid transition and sustained 
growth. Countries with relatively low average inflation rates are expected to attract more 
capital flows, as macroeconomic risks are lower in these countries. Our result may be due 
to potential endogeneity, as it may be closely related to other policy factor: successful and 
swift disinflation generally occurs before the countries liberalize the external sector. 
Overall, we find that FDI into transition countries is driven mainly by persistence, 
large market size, low labor cost, and abundant natural resources. Moreover, countries with 
good institutions, greater trade openness, and fewer restrictions on FDI flows are likely to 
receive more FDI.  
 
 
4.2  Is FDI into the CIS Countries Driven by Different Factors?   
 
The motives of FDI vary across sectors in which the firm operates. For example, for 
natural-resource-based industries, foreign investors will base their location choice on the 
availability of natural resources. For export-oriented industries (e.g., footwear, garments, 
and car-parts assembling), low labor costs will be more important. 
Despite the obvious importance of studies of FDI determinants at the more 
disaggregated level, the evidence on sectoral differences is rather scarce in the existing 
literature for transition economies. One of the few studies is Shiells (2003), which reports 
for each of fifteen CIS countries the sectoral and source-country composition of FDI 
inflows. He finds that FDI in the CIS countries concentrates mainly in natural resource 
extraction or energy related infrastructure. FDI in the CEEB, on the other hand, was 
predominantly in the manufacturing sector (Resmini, 2000).  Yuko Kinoshita and Nauro F. Campos  Estimating the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows:  





In our data set, comparable statistics on sectoral breakdown are not available for 
many countries. Yet we expect to find different determinants for different sectors in FDI. 
To introduce sectoral differences with this limitation of the existing data, we divide the 
sample into two groups, CEEB (that is, non-CIS) and CIS. If sectoral differences in the 
location determinants are important, then we would also find different factors at work in 
driving FDI into the two groups of countries. 
Table 3 shows GMM group-wise regressions for the CIS and the non-CIS 
countries. The Sargan and SOC tests show that the model is correctly specified.
39 The 
GMM estimators are asymptotically biased in a small sample. As an alternative, we present 
results with those from a fixed-effects model in Table 4.  
Tables 3 and 4 show important differences between the non-CIS and the CIS 
countries. First, persistence or agglomeration is present for the non-CIS countries, but no 
longer for the CIS countries. Second, the abundance of natural resources is one of the most 
important determinants for the CIS countries, while it has an insignificant effect for the 
non-CIS countries. Third, telephone lines are significant only for the CIS countries. 
Finally, trade dependence is more important for the CIS countries. On the other hand, 
external liberalization, rule of law, quality of bureaucracy, and restrictions on FDI matter 
for both groups of countries.  
What is also noteworthy is that economic fundamentals such as market size and 
labor cost lose their statistical significance in the presence of reform, policy, and 
institutional variables.
40 Particularly for the non-CIS countries, inward FDI is explained 
mainly by the agglomeration effect, the progress of external liberalization, good 
institutions, and fewer restrictions on foreign capital. For the CIS countries, in addition to 
these factors, resource abundance and the availability of telephone lines are important.  
The different determinants for the two groups of countries may reflect sectoral 
differences as well as differences in initial conditions. The greater importance of 
agglomeration in the non-CIS countries is consistent with greater externalities in the 
manufacturing sector. Positive externalities arising from specialized labor, and user and 
                                                 
39 We also estimated the GMM when market size and labor cost are weakly exogenous, but the estimators are 
similar. Since a small sample bias may be severe when the instrument matrix gets larger, we report here the 
results from strictly exogenous instrumental variables.    
40 The insignificance of market size and labor cost may be associated with endogeneity of these variables. We 
also estimated the model by treating both variables as weakly endogenous, but their statistical insignificance 
remained. BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
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supplier linkages, were more relevant for the manufacturing than for the resource sector. In 
the natural resource sector, investors may have less incentive to agglomerate, as more 
investors mean fewer resources for each to extract. 
Turning to the fixed-effects model in Table 4, we find the same results in both 
groups as in Table 3. The sizes of coefficients are almost identical in the CIS countries in 
Tables 3 and 4, which implies that the gains from employing the GMM might be marginal 
in a small sample size such as the CIS countries.  
Research conducted by the EBRD finds that energy resources in some of the CIS 
countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia) have tended to 
generate larger resource rents. This reduces the likelihood of reform, as incumbent elites 
appropriate more rents, and it impedes efficient resource allocation.
41 In contrast, here we 
find that resource wealth can also be a ‘blessing.’ Resource abundance attracts FDI 
inflows, which not only bring capital and employment, but also increase productivity and 
efficiency of domestic industries via technology transfer (Campos and Kinoshita, 2002).
42 
Whether or not FDI inflows can provide the necessary impetus for further reforms 
is another matter. Natural resources may create a strong initial incentive for FDI. But 
without sound institutions and trade openness, FDI inflows may not continue as energy 
reserves dwindle in a country. To extend the benefits of FDI, the CIS countries need to 
channel more FDI into other sectors such as manufacturing, with a longer expected life. 
We consistently find that international trade plays an important role in attracting 
FDI. The significance of trade dependence shows that the more open the country was at the 
start of transition (1989), the more FDI it receives.  
Improved governance reflected in the high score of quality of bureaucracy also 
helps increase FDI flows. Some might argue that oil companies are used to dealing with 
corrupt governments and that they place less emphasis on the quality of bureaucracy. But 
even for the CIS countries, our results show that good governance encourages more FDI 
inflows. Similarly, a weak legal system, including property rights violations, is an 
impediment to foreign investment. This may be because a poor legal system implies a 
greater extent of state involvement in the economy and greater difficulties in contract 
enforcement. In sum, the geographical distribution of FDI across transition economies is 
                                                 
41 See Esanov, Raiser, and Buiter (2001).  
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accounted for by persistence, the progress of external liberalization, trade openness, good 
governance, and a sound legal system. In addition, for the CIS countries, the main drivers 
of FDI are abundance of natural resources and the availability of basic infrastructures such 
as the main telephone lines.  
Although market size and labor cost are not statistically significant in group-wise 
regressions, one should not dismiss the importance of these economic fundamentals. In the 
current specification, we try to explain the spatial distribution of FDI among 25 transition 
economies, which is a subset of the global market. Within our samples, average labor cost 
is substantially lower than that in the Western market. Thus, we predict that lower labor 
costs are one reason why firms invest in transition countries. Within the set of 25 countries, 
the variance in labor cost may be relatively small. This may explain why labor cost loses 
its statistical significance. A large domestic market size might be important if FDI aims to 
serve a domestic consumer market. But in our sample its effect on overall FDI flows is 
rather limited.  
 
 
5  Conclusions   
 
In this paper, we study the factors accounting for the geographical patterns of FDI inflows 
among 25 transition economies using panel data for the period 1990–98. The location 
determinants are classified into three categories. The first comprises country-specific 
advantages such as low-cost labor, large domestic market, skilled labor force, adequate 
infrastructure, and proximity to the Western European markets. The second is institutions, 
macroeconomic policy and other policies that facilitate business-operating conditions. The 
third reflects the persistent pattern of FDI driven by agglomeration economies.  
The main finding is that is that once we include the variables for the full sample of 
transition economies, the determinants of FDI inflows are much more complex than 
previously thought. This reflects our finding that FDI in transition is an intricate mixture of 
the various types of FDI (resource-, market- and efficiency-seeking). We find that these 
FDI inflows are determined by the availability of natural resources and low labor costs. 
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Poor quality of the bureaucracy is found to be a deterrent to foreign investors as the 
increased transaction costs adversely affect profitability of investment projects. A similar 
argument is made with respect to the rule of law, which was also found to be an important 
determinant of FDI in transition economies. Furthermore, foreign investors prefer 
transition countries that are more open to trade and with fewer restrictions on FDI. We also 
find that progress on external liberalization plays a large role. 
Finally, FDI motives vary greatly between the non-CIS and the CIS countries. In 
the non-CIS countries that receive FDI mostly in the manufacturing sector, institutions and 
agglomeration are the main considerations for investors. In the CIS countries that receive 
FDI mostly in the resource sector, natural resource abundance and infrastructure are the 
crucial factors.  
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Table 1. Definitions of Variables 
 
FDI stock per capita   Cumulative FDI stock per capita (constant million US$) [Source: 
The World Bank, World Development Indicators] 
Lagged FDI   One-year lagged cumulative FDI stock per capita 
Market size  Real per capita GDP using chain method [Source: Penn World 
Table 6] 
Labor  cost  Gross nominal wage [Source: UNECE, Economic Survey of 
Europe ]   
Education  General secondary school enrolment (%) [ Source: UNICEF] 
Natural resources  Natural resource endowment: =0 if poor, =1 if moderate, and =2 if 
rich [Source: De Melo et al (1997)] 
Distance Brussels  Distance from Brussels to the capital city (km) 
Telephone lines  Number of telephone mainlines per 1,000 people 
Inflation  Annual average of current inflation rate (%) 
External liberalization  Cumulative external liberalization index  
Rule  of  law  The variable “law and order” that assesses the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system and popular observance of the law 
[Source: International Country Risk Guide] 
Bureaucracy  Quality of bureaucracy [Source: Campos (2000)] 
Trade dependence  Trade dependence as a share of GDP in 1989 [Source: De Melo et 
al (1997)] 
Restrictions on FDI  The index of governmental restrictions on FDI inflows [Source: 
Garibaldi et al (2001)] 
 Yuko Kinoshita and Nauro F. Campos  Estimating the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows:  






Table 2. Determinants of FDI : Fixed Effects Model and GMM 
 















Market size  0.01  
(0.008) 
0.01   
(0.01)  
0.01   
(0.008)  


































































     
N 119  99  99 
2 R   0.93 _____  _____ 
Sargan test  _____  0.001  0.906 
SOC _____  0.83  0.93 
 
Notes: *** , **, and *  indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance level, respectively. Figures 
in parentheses are standard errors. Time dummies are included in regressions.  The difference between the 
two columns labeled “GMM” is that market size and labor cost are treated as predetermined variables in the 
last one. BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 






Table 3. Determinants of FDI: GMM 
 
 







    




















































N 67  32 
Sargan test  0.1301  0.9994 
SOC 0.56  0.75 
 
Notes: *** , **, and *  indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance level, respectively. Figures 
in parentheses are standard errors. Time dummies are included in regressions.  Yuko Kinoshita and Nauro F. Campos  Estimating the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows:  






Table 4. Determinants of FDI : Fixed Effects Model 
 







    




















































N 80  39 
2 R   0.74 0.68 
 
Notes: *** , **, and *  indicate 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance level, respectively. Figures 
in parentheses are standard errors. Time dummies are included in regressions.  
 BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 







Appendix 1.Summary Statistics 
 
  Obs  Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
        
FDI stock per capita  188  164  295  0  1771 
Lagged FDI stock  163  131  250  0  1572 
Market  size  165  6955 3249 1012  15170 
Labor cost  151  167  217  0.02  1247 
Education 225  19  8  4.4  51 
Natural resources  225  0.52  0.75  0  2 
Distance Brussels  225  2222  1387  719  522 
Telephone lines  219  162  88  0  374 
Inflation 225  434  1304  -0.8  15606 
External liberalization  225  2.74  2.45  0  9.5 
Rule of law  171  4.47  0.75  3  6 
Quality of bureaucracy  225  2.45 1.63 0.83 8.33 
Trade  dependence  211  19  12 0 41 






Appendix 2. Correlation Matrix 
 
  FDI   Lag FDI  Size of  
market 
Wages HK  Nat 
Res 
Dist Tele Infl  Fiscal 
bal 






                    
                    
Lagged  FDI    0.984                  
Size  of  the  market  0.556  0.529                
Wages  0.429  0.397  0.61               
Education  0.248  0.234  0.44  0.34              
Natural  resources    -0.275 -0.261  -0.234 -0.231 -0.197                   
Distance Brussels    -0.371  -0.34  -0.669  -0.436  -0.416  0.256                 
Telephone lines   0.4313  0.4178  0.6293  0.4991  0.7676  -0.389  -0.516               
Inflation    -0.213 -0.187  -0.206 -0.225 -0.11  0.1264 0.209 -0.12             
Fiscal balance  0.2384  0.2034  0.3235  0.3228  0.2635 -0.046 -0.268  0.274  -0.51           
External 
liberalization   
0.6526 0.6404  0.4114  0.6113  0.4828  -0.349 -0.399  0.536 -0.37  0.3084         
Rule of law   0.4614  0.4241  0.2808  0.3890  -0.157 -0.264 -0.187 0.1407 -0.058 0.1494 0.3002       
Quality 
bureaucracy 
0.5994 0.5724  0.5287  0.1723  0.1215  -0.364  -0.522 0.189 -0.25 0.2117  0.4558 0.564     
Trade  dependence  -0.201 -0.204  -0.431 -0.438  0.102 -0.085 0.398 0.057 0.186  -0.024  -0.321 -0.335  -0.42   
Restrictions to FDI 
 
-0.408 -0.373  -0.326 -0.194 -0.062 0.3691 0.113 -0.25  0.028  0.025 -0.215  -0.298 -0.36  0.201 BOFIT Discussion Papers  http://www.bof.fi/bofit 
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